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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By LAWRENCE D. LAYERS
I. RULE 16
Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure has raised
relatively few problems in the Colorado courts. As an inevitable
result, the scope of the trial judge's authority in pre-trial proceedings remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. One case in 1963,
Glisan v. Kurth,1 served to lift a corner of the shroud: Glisan, the
defendant in an action for damages brought by Kurth, sought to
make Moore Realty Company a third party defendant in the suit.
His third party complaint and his amended third party complaint
were dismissed on Moore's motion for failure to state a claim. A
pre-trial conference was held during which the court ordered
Glisan to submit to all parties a list of witnesses and a "brief statement concerning the subject matter of their testimony" together
with his second amended third party complaint. The list of witnesses
was submitted, but the substance of their proposed testimony apparently was not. The court dismissed the second amended third
party complaint solely because of Glisan's failure to detail testimony
expected to be produced in support of it.
The supreme court, Pringle, J., reversed.
While a court may certainly order parties to furnish
opposing counsel with the names of witnesses to be called
at the trial, and to make a general statement of the issues
and subject matter to which this testimony will be directed,
such authority does not permit the court to dismiss a case
because the complaining party is unable to detail specifically the evidence such witnesses will give, especially where
some of those witnesses are adverse.2
Although this case is, strictly speaking, one of first impression
in the Colorado courts, it is believed to be consistent with the purposes of pre-trial procedures and with the general import of prior
related cases. "[P] re-trial conferences are not intended, nor have
they ever been, to serve as a substitute for the regular trial of
cases." 3 Rule 16 does not provide an alternative for discovery proceedings4 and for this reason does not require a "disclosure of the
details of the issues to be made by the pleadings."5 It does not "compel the production of any documents or force the making of any admissions." 6 Furthermore, it "confers no special powers of dismissal
not otherwise contained in the rules."'7 Even the power to preclude
issues from trial "should be exercised only to the extent necessary
to achieve the desired purpose - that is, an entirely just disposition
of the case in a speedy and efficient manner."s
This last statement must be emphasized. Although the purpose
of Rule 16 is expediency, it is just expediency - to secure early
Junior Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 384 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 949.
.3 Lynn v. Smith, 281 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1960).
4 Markle v. Sordoni, 64 Pa. D. & C. 424 (1948).
5 Duffy v. Gross, 121 Colo. 198, 214 P.2d 498 (1950).
6 McCoy v. District Court of Lorimer County, 126 Colo. 32, 246 P.2d 6119 (1952).
7 Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959).
8 Id. at 915.
*
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settlements of cases without sacrifice of the substantive or procedural rights of the parties. Allowing the judge to pass on the
weight of proposed evidence, no matter how detailed its description
or how weakly controverted the issue, would be such a sacrifice of
rights. It would be in effect the equivalent of a forced admission
or other equally serious denial of due process.
II.

RULE

24

One case in 1963, Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co.,9 dealt with Rule
24, R.C.P. Colo., Intervention. Beau Monde Co. sought to build a
shopping center on land in the City of Englewood but was denied
a building permit on the grounds that the property was zoned R-1-A.
The company filed an action against the city and its building inspector to compel the issuance of the permit. Roosevelt and ten
others moved to intervene as owners and occupants of residence
properties "immediately abutting the subject property." The land
of six of the intervenors was alleged to be in Englewood but that
of the other five was alleged to be in the town of Cherry Hills
Village which adjoins Englewood. In their motion the intervenors
alleged a diversity of interest between themselves and the city, and,
consequently, inadequate representation. The supreme court, Hall,
J., reversed the ruling of the District Court of Arapahoe County
denying intervention, and remanded with directions to grant the
motion.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first reported case
in which the intervenors in a zoning case were from without the
zoning municipality. Far from prohibiting this, the Colorado court
took it as evidence that since "Englewood is without authority to
employ counsel to represent such persons and any effort to do so
would be outside of and beyond the scope of its power-'"10 the residents of Cherry Hills Village were without any representation and
thus came within the provision of Rule 24(a) (2), allowing intervention of right.
Perhaps a more interesting aspect of the case is provided by
an analysis of the court's path to its conclusion that all the plaintiffs in error were entitled to intervene as of right. Rule 24, R.C.P.
Colo., provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2)
when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by a judgment in the action . ...
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action .... (2)
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common ....
There was no question as to the timeliness of the application.
Futhermore, the court gave indication that, even if it had not been
admitted by the parties, the court would have found that "there can
be no doubt that the rights of those seeking intervention will be
9 394 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1963).
10 Id. at 100.
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bound by any judgment in the case."" The court cited no authority,
but there is some precedent for this view."
As can be readily seen, there remains but to establish that "the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or
may be inadequate" in order to bring the case within Rule 24(a).
I have already noted that the court concluded for the nonresident
applicants that no representation was inadequate representation.
The court also concluded that the remaining applicants were entitled to intervention under Rule 24(a), but it chose a method of
reaching this conclusion that can only be termed confusing.
The court cites Wolpe v. Poretsky1" as a comparable situation
in which intervention was allowed. The situation was indeed comparable and intervention was allowed, but in Wolpe the intervenors
relied solely on Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(a duplicate of Colorado Rule 24 (b)), and the court was forced to
make its decision on that basis. Consequently, the conclusion drawn
by the court that the appellants might intervene as of right must be
regarded as mere dictum, a fact which renders the case at best a
weak precedent for the present decision.
The second case cited as authority is Herzog v. City of Pocatello.44 Herzog is also decided on the basis of Rule 24 (b), the Idaho
rule being identical to that of Colorado. In fact, a portion of the
opinion quoted by the Colorado court in the present case conclusively demonstrates this: "We are of the view that appellants' defense and the main action have a question of law in common and
that appellants have sufficient interest in the matter in litigation
to entitle them to intervene."' 15
The supreme court then goes on to cite, apparently as an apology for its failure to utilize cases dealing with the proper portion
of the rule, Textile Workers Union of America v. Allendale Co., 16
which is concerned with the permissibility of intervention in a review of an administrative proceeding. The court in that case was
bent upon enlarging the scope of allowable intervention to include
situations not expressly covered by Rule 24 but in which the court
finds a sound reason for intervention. Since in the present case the
court brings the facts within the express terms of Rule 24 (a), the
Textile Worker case would seem to be largely irrelevant.
In Kozak v. Wells' 7 the court at last finds a case dealing with
Rule 24(a) (2), but it deals neither with zoning nor with the adequacy of representation of property owners whose property was
affected merely by virtue of propinquity. It is a title action and the
eventuality which entitles the intervenors to have their petition
granted is that their title may actually be placed in jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the case is not precedent for the
proposition that contiguous landowners in a zoning action are or
may be inadequately represented by city officials. It is not clear
upon what basis the court does place its reliance. An educated guess
would be that it is merely that Rule 24 is to be liberally construed11 Ibid.
12
13
14
15
16
17

Wolpe v.
Ibid.
82 Idaho
356 P.2d
226 F.2d
278 F.2d

Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C.

Cir. 1944).

505, 356 P.2d 54 (1960).
a 56, quoted in 384 P.2d at 102.
765 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
104 (8th Cir. 1960).
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that a certainty of inadequate representation is not required, a mere
possibility being sufficient. This point was, indeed, dealt upon at
length in Kozak but is not mentioned in the rather cryptic passage
quoted by Mr. Justice Hall. The entire reference is as follows:
In Kozak v. Wells, 8 Cir., 278 F.2d 104, 84 A.L.R.2d 1400, it
is said:
"We are influenced, also, by the realization that the
allowance of intervention here will be in line with the command of Rule 1, F.R.C.P., that the rules 'be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action' * * *
"In summary, therefore, we conclude that the appellants are entitled to intervene of right. Like Ford, supra,
[249 F.2d 27.] we regard this case as one where 'the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute right to intervene.' * * *."Is
Reading this, one would be inclined to believe that Kozak was
on all fours with the Beau Monde fact situation, an entirely misleading impression.
The subsequent citation of Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros.,
Inc.19 is equally unclear. It states enough of the facts of the case to
show that the intervenor's interest has nothing to do with rights
of a property owner and then says: "This, we think, is a situation
where 'the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute
right to intervene.' . . . o20
I must confess that I do not understand how it is that the fact
that a customer of a railroad should be allowed to intervene in a
suit to enjoin the railroad from providing service because it is a
"practical necessity" has any bearing upon whether it is such a
practical necessity to allow the present intervention. I assume the
court wished to show that "practical necessities" denote an absolute right to intervene. It does not say so, nor does it make any
visible attempt to show that such necessity existed.
In both of these last two references, Kozak and Ford, isolated
segments of the opinions were quoted out of context without revealing the purpose for which the quotations were made. This, of
course, makes me wonder if there was, in fact, any compelling
reason that they should be included. The fact that I happen to
have found more or less relevant rules of law in the cases cited is
no certain indication that the citations were made to establish the
existence of those rules. I cannot help but feel that this is a situation in which the court determined that it wanted to allow
intervention but was unable to find a sequence of logical steps
which would inevitably lead to the required conclusion that the
intervenors might not be adequately represented. It therefore
seems to have secreted a cloud of intervention cases in the general
direction of zoning and run from point A to point B under cover
of the opaque fog. The squid has developed this technique to a fine
art.
Actually, the court found what I believe to be sufficient rea1.9384 P.2d at 102.
19249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957).
20 384 P.2d at 103.
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son to determine the case as it did without going through the
tedious task of citing pointless cases. "Possibly, and probably, Englewood would benefit by the construction of the shopping center, and yet certain individual residents and
property owners be
21
adversely affected by such constructions." '
Since there are cases in other jurisdictions holding on both
sides of the question of adequacy of representation in similar zoning
cases,22 the decision really boils down to one of policy and could
conceivably be made in either direction. But in making a policy
decision, if it is necessary to cite cases, it would seem to be the
wiser course to cite applicable ones, or at least to expressly recognize the deficiencies of the almost relevant ones rather than to
make abstruse and confusing references in the sublime confidence
that it doesn't really matter anyway since the decision is obviously
the equitable one.
III.

RULE

59

In a series of five cases, the supreme court reiterated the necessity under Rule 59 (f) of filing a motion for new trial as a prerequisite to review on writ of error. Minshall v. Pettit2 3 held that such
a motion was required even after a mere hearing for the granting or
denying of a temporary injunction. This ruling was followed by
Bayers v. W.O.W., Inc.,24 Chief Justice Frantz dissenting on the
ground that "failure to file a motion for a new trial in the trial court
is an irregularity . ..such irregularity can be waived."
Noice v. Jorgenson2 5 and Denver Feed Co. v. Winters26 further
established that, after a trial to the court, "the filing of objections to
findings of the trial court (under Rule 52 (b)) clearly do [sic] not
serve as a motion for new trial and do [sic] not constitute a compliance with Rule 59."27
In Martinez v. Bond, "" Martinez' complaint was dismissed by the
trial court on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The writ of error was dismissed, even
though there was no trial to begin with, because there was no
motion for a new trial or order of the trial court dispensing therewith.
29
But in a sixth case, Noland v. Colorado School of Trades, Inc.,
the court carved out an exception to its seemingly well-established
rule. The trial court had granted the defendant school's motion for
a judgment non obstante veredicto, vacating a 16,000 dollar judgment in favor of Noland. Noland elected to stand on the record as
made and seek review of the single question of whether the trial
court erred in granting the motion for judgment n.o.v. The school
moved to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that a "Motion for
21 384 P.2d at 101.
22 Intervention allowed of right: Oakton Crawford Corp. v. Village of Skokie, 28 III. App. 2d
507, 171 N.E.2d 814 (1961); East Maine Township Community Ass'n v. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank,
15 Ill. App. 2d 250, 145 N.E.2d 777 (1957). Intervention not of right: Glenel Realty Corp. v. Worthington, 4 App. Div. 2d 202, 164 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1957), appeal dismissed, 3 N.Y.2d 924, 167 N.Y.S.2d
939, 145 N.E.2d 880 (1957).
23 379 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1963).
24 379 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1963).
25 378 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1963).
26 380 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1963).
27 Id. at 679.
28 379 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1963).
29 386 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1963).
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a New Trial" was not filed by Noland following the entry of judgment. The supreme court denied this motion, saying:
He is not compelled by Rule 59 (f) R.C.P. Colo., to file a
motion for new trial in circumstances where he doesn't
want a new trial. If he elects to stand upon the record as
made he is not compelled to run the risk involved in filing
a motion for a new trial, which, if granted, would deprive
him of his right to review upon the question of whether the
court erred
in entering a judgment notwithstanding the
30
verdict.
The analogy drawn by the court is to the right of a litigant
adversely affected by a grant of a new trial to stand upon the record
as made and thereby secure a review of the single question of
whether the trial court erred in granting such motion.
The exception as it appears in this case seems to be a wholly
admirable one. Without it, a party might be deprived of a beneficial
jury verdict by the error of the trial court. He would be caught on
the horns of a dilemma: without the motion he could not secure
review; with it he might be required to undergo the expense and
risk of another trial which he does not want. It would be foolish to
require him to file his motion and then to allow him to stand on the
record of the first trial in the second trial, entirely unwanted by
either side, in order to review the granting of a judgment n.o.v.
The question arises as to whether the exception should be
limited to the facts of this case or should be extended to any situation in which the litigant does not want a new trial. The closest
analogy would be in the case of a party adversely affected by a
motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59 (e). The same
reasoning as above applies.
There is a more common example. A party adversely affected
by the granting of a motion for new trial may "stand upon the
record as made" and refuse to take part in the new trial, which
then proceeds to a judgment against him. He may then secure a
review of the trial court's ruling on the motion without going
through the motion of moving for a third trial.3 1 Indeed, it would
be sheer formalism to require him to make such a motion.
Thus it would seem that there is no reason to require a motion
for new trial in any case in which a litigant wishes to reinstate a
favorable verdict or judgment that has been vacated by a judicial
act. Additionally, there does not seem to be any other situation in
which a litigant would not prefer a new trial to any other permissible action by the appellate court. It is therefore concluded that the
exception which the court has made to Rule 59(f) in the instant
case is a wise one in its generality.
IV.

60
Brief mention should perhaps be made of Terry v. Terry,32 if
only to emphasize that it is possible to seek equitable relief from a
judgment in either of two ways: by motion under Rule 60 (b) or by
an independent action.
RULE

30 Id. at 361.
31 Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951).
32 387 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1963).
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Relief from a decree in a divorce proceeding was sought pertaining to the question of alimony. The defendant moved to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction because: (1) "the judgment from which
plaintiff seeks relief is more than six months old and plaintiff is
barred in this proceeding by Rule 60 (b) of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure," and (2) the issue of alimony was or "should have
been before the court at the time of the entry of the aforementioned
divorce decree" and was therefore res judicata.13
The trial court granted the motion, but the supreme court reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice McWilliams that was short and
to the point. Since this was an independent action and not a motion
under Rule 60 (b), "the six months time limitation contained in said
rule has no application." The only applicable limitations of time
were laches and the statute of limitations. These, like res judicata,
are affirmative defenses and, under Rule 8 (c), R.C.P. Colo., must be
affirmatively pleaded. I must say that, in my opinion, seldom has
such a summary defeat been so richly deserved.
V.

RULE

98

4
City & County of Denver v. Glendale Water & Sanitation Dist.a
is a completely orthodox case, but since there are so few cases dealing with Rule 98(a), a very brief outline of it without comment
might be of some use.
Denver wanted to enjoin the Sanitation District from constructing a sewage plant on the ground that it would deposit sewage in
the channel of Cherry Creek which would, in turn, carry it through
Denver. The only part of the case on writ of error that is important
for our purposes is Denver's contention that the order for change
of venue from the City and County of Denver to Arapahoe County,
where the Sanitation District is located, was erroneously issued.
Rule 98 (a), R.C.P. Colo., reads as follows: "All actions affecting
property, franchises, or utilities shall be tried in the county in
which the subject of the action, or a substantial part thereof, is
situated."
The court first held that the Sanitation District is a municipal
utility within the meaning of Rule 98 (a) and should have been sued
in the county in which it was located. Mr. Chief Justice Frantz then
went on to say:
In ascertaining the venue of an injunctive proceeding, the
court should probe for the primary purpose of the suit. If
the suit for injunction is not ancillary-and in this case it is
not-, and if the decree sought would operate as restraint
upon the person, it is clearly an action in personam. [Citations ommitted.]
There is no merit in the contention of Denver that this is
an action affecting property [Cherry Creek] .... At best,
property is indirectly affected. But it is not
3 5 sufficient to
establish venue for a suit affecting property.
The change of venue, therefore, was properly made.
33 Id. at 903.
34 380 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1963).
35 Id. at 554.
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Rippy v. Cowieson has no place in this ordered scheme of
things because it seems simultaneously to deal with everything and
nothing. No rule of civil procedure is mentioned, no case is cited,
and the only statute referred to deals with the construction of reservoirs. Yet it is obviously a civil procedure case and equally obviously it reaches the most equitable decision and properly reprimands a wayward trial judge.
The case arises out of an oral "cost plus" contract to grade a
road and construct a reservoir on defendant's land. Although many
alterations in design were made, including a change in the height of
the dam from five or six feet to twenty, defendant refused to pay
the plaintiff contractors' bill of almost five times the two thousand
dollar estimate.
At the trial one of the plaintiffs stated on cross-examination
that the height of the dam had been increased to twenty feet and
that no approval for its construction had been obtained from the
state engineer. The defendant immediately moved for dismissal on
the grounds that C.R.S. '53 § 147-5-537 had not been complied with,
that therefore by the terms of the statute the work was not completed, and that payment was not to become due until the work was
completed. From this motion proceeded a veritable comedy of
errors, the final curtain of which never fell.
The trial court entered its order of dismissal over the plaintiffs'
plaintive objection that they had not completed their case. The
poor plaintiffs, still game if a little battered by this wholly unexpected turn of events, asked that the order be vacated. Denied.
They then asked for a reinstatement and a continuance, and that
the defendant be directed to cooperate in securing the necessary
approval from the state engineer's office. Denied, and formal judgment entered. The judgment very obligingly included findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the effect that, since by operation of
the statute on facts admitted by the plaintiffs, the contract had not
been completed, the action was premature and was dismissed without prejudice. Motion for new trial was dispensed with.
Of course, there is the minor point to be considered that the
completion of the contract was not put in issue by the pleadings,
defendant having admitted some liability to the plaintiffs, nor had
the pleadings been amended. Apparently such a simple consideration as amendment was not thought by the defendant to be dramatic enough.
Whereupon the plaintiffs filed their writ of error.
The setting of act two of our little play is the briefs of the
parties before the supreme court. In view of the course later taken
36 379 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1963).
37 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 147-5-5 (1953) reads as follows: "Approval of plans for reservoir. - No
reservoir of a capacity of more than one thousand acre-feet or having a dam or embankment in excess
of ten feet in vertical height, or having a surface area at high water in excess of twenty acres
shall hereafter be constructed in this state except that the plans and specifications for the same shall
have first been approved by the state engineer and filed in his office. The state engineer shall act
as consulting engineer during the construction thereof, and shall have authority to require the
material used and the work of construction to be done to his satisfaction. No work shall be deemed
complete until the state engineer shall furnish to the owners of such structures a written statement
of the work of consruction and the full completion thereof, together with his acceptance of the same,
which statement shall specify the dimensions of such dam and capacity of such reservoir."
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by the court, only one of the plaintiffs' arguments on appeal is important: "Rule 8(c) and Rule 12 (b), R.C.P. Colo., require the defendant to plead 147-5-5, C.R.S. 1953, as an affirmative defense if it
is to be urged affirmatively or in avoidance. Such a defense cannot
be raised in the middle of a trial on motion, especially without
amendment of the pleadings. '3 Plaintiffs being the "straight men"
and heroes of our drama, this statement appears to be substantially
correct. But does it not seem strange that there is no mention in the
brief of Rule 41 (b) (1), which provides for motion for dismissal "on
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief," after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence? No mention is made by the plaintiff of the propriety
of such a motion before the completion of plaintiffs' case.
The defendant's answer was, inter alia, that this was not a new
defense at all but a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction which,
under Rule 12 (h) (2), R.C.P. Colo., may be interposed at any time.
the case, but never fear. The defendant did not press the point, and
the word was not heard again. The defendant's major concern was
whether the contract was or was not completed. He seems to have
assumed that his motion was on jurisdictional grounds with the
same certainty that the plaintiffs assumed that it was not.
Enter, then, the supreme court for the denouement. Mr. Justice
Hall's opinion states that "the trial court disregarded the issues as
38 Brief of plaintiffs in error, p. 10.
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made by the pleadings, made no findings or disposition of any issue
before the court, and made findings on matters that were not a part
of the pleadings or before the court for determination." This is true.
It emphasizes that the issues made by the pleadings remain undetermined. Then, like a true deus ex machina, the opinion concludes that "it was error for the trial court to suspend the taking of
testimony and to entertain the motion to dismiss." Exit.
In summary, the opinion is almost totally ambiguous. We know
that Judge Blickhahn in the trial court did something wrong, but
we do not know precisely what it was. Is it always error to grant
a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) before the termination of the plaintiff's case, or is it so only when there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issues in the pleadings?
I might add as an aside here that the only reason I believe this to
be a 41(b) motion is that, according to Rule 52 (a), "Findings of
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions
under rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in rule
41 (b)"; and Mr. Justice Hall emphasized the absence of such findings and conclusions. The answer to the ambiguity is not provided
by the opinion.
It should be mentioned that during the entire play there was a
ghost in the wings: Rule 111 (a) (1); the final judgment rule. The
judgment of dismissal was without prejudice. There seems to have
been a tacit agreement to consider this unimportant, but several
jurisdictions hold that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final
judgment. 39 Others, of course, hold that it is final.40 Wyoming has
an odd case which recognizes that there is no unanimity on the
subject, but says that since the attorneys did not argue the point,
the supreme court would accept the apparent opinion of the parties
that the judgment was final. It adds that the trial court should not
dismiss without prejudice
unless it intends thereby to say that the
41
order is not final.
I am not advocating that any particular rule be adopted here.
I just feel that it is worthy of comment that a point of jurisdictional
importance, by an adverse decision of which this case could never
have been decided, has never been dealt with in Colorado. In fact,
the only Colorado case ever to deal with the finality of any dismissal 42 was decided in 1878, and furthermore cannot mean what it
says: "A judgment of nonsuit rendered by the court in the exercise
of this power is, as to the defendant, in invitum; is a complete disposition of the case, and is final within the meaning of the statute
concerning appeals."'43 The judgment is without the consent of the
plaintiff, not the defendant. Does it not seem that this -question
merits more than tacit consideration by the courts?
39 Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93, 163 S.W.2d 273 (1942); Sand v. Queen City Packing Co., 108
N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1961); Mallory v. Taylor, 90 Va. 348, 18 S.E. 438 (1898); Marcus v. McClure, 63
W. Va. 215, 59 S.E. 1055 (1907). See also Dent v. Dolan, 220 Ore. 313, 349 P.2d 500 (1960). Note
that some of these cases deal with voluntary rather than involuntary dismissal.
40 Grubbs v. Slater & Gilroy, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1954); C.I.T.Corp. v. Teogue, 293 Ky.
521, 169 S.W.2d 593 (1943); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653, 197 AtI. 137 (1938); First Nat'l Bank of
Jackson v. Graham, 242 Miss. 879, 137 So. 2d 193 (1962); Atkins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 482, 82
N.W.2d 632 (1957); Hoffman v. Knaus, 135 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
41 Thompson v. Searl, 76 Wyo. 264, 301 P.2d 804 (1956).
42 Corning Tunnel Co. v. Pell, 4 Colo. 184 (1878).
43 Ibid.

